From scratch to efficiency gains after a financial crisis? A tale of a restructured banking system

We study the efficiency of the Argentine banking system after the 2001–2002 crisis. The financial system had to be restructured from scratch and recovered jointly with the economy, but its productivity and average cost levels have been stagnant since 2007. The analysis includes efficiency frontier estimations for retail banks and a comparison of subsamples for different categories of banks for the period 2005–15. We try to determine whether public banks are more efficient than private ones, whether privatized are more efficient than always private, as well as national versus foreign entities. Our findings show a modest average efficiency of the system and quite similar efficiency rankings for the different groups of banks. On average, public tend to be slightly more cost efficient than private, and national are slightly more efficient than foreign.     

Modeling exchange rate dependence dynamics at different time horizons

Despite an extensive body of research, the best way to model the dependence of exchange rates remains an open question. In this paper we present a new approach which employs a flexible time-varying copula model. It allows the conditional correlation between exchange rates to be both time-varying and modeled independently from the marginal distributions. We introduce a dynamic specification for the correlation using the Fisher transformation. Applied to Euro/US dollar and Japanese Yen/US dollar, our results reveal a significantly time-varying correlation, dependent on the past return realizations. We find that a time-varying copula with the proposed correlation specification gives better results than alternative dynamic benchmark models. The dynamic copula model outperforms at six different time horizons, ranging from hourly to daily, confirming the model specification.     

Stochastic vs. deterministic frontier distance output function: Evidence from Brazilian higher education institutions

Journal of Productivity Analysis - Using data from the Brazilian Higher Education Census and other public institutions, this study aims to obtain and compare efficiency scores from stochastic...     

Unfair inequality and growth*

Fighting against economic inequality is one fundamental social goal in the agendas of most governments. However, recent studies highlight that people actually prefer unequal societies, as they accept inequality generated by an individual's effort and wish to reduce only unfair inequality (generated by factors beyond an individual's control). This distinction might help to explain the fundamental unsolved question about whether inequality is good or bad for growth: unfair inequality (UI) could be growth-deterring, while fair inequality (FI) might be growth-enhancing. We derive a reduced-form growth equation from a stylized overlapping-generations model with human capital that includes FI, UI, and poverty. Then, using an instrumental variable approach, we show for alternative samples and inequality measures at the worldwide level that the estimated coefficient associated with UI is always negative, while the coefficient of total inequality increases when UI is included in the regression. Moreover, we find that poverty mediates this relationship because the higher the poverty rate, the smaller the impact of either type of inequality on growth.     

Special issue: 20th anniversary of the Portuguese Economic Journal. Editors’ introduction

Portuguese Economic Journal -     

Deceitful when insecure: The effect of self-efficacy beliefs on the use of deception in negotiations

This article investigates if and how negotiators' self-efficacy beliefs affect their use of deception in negotiation. Specifically, we propose that self-efficacy can be interpreted as a threat to self-concept, which encourages individuals to temporarily bypass self-regulatory obstacles by morally disengaging their cognitive moral filters, thereby enabling them to use deception in negotiation. We test our hypotheses in three independent experimental studies involving an interactive negotiation simulation, totalizing 460 participants. We find that negotiators with low self-efficacy regarding their negotiation abilities are more likely to use deception than those with high self-efficacy beliefs. Furthermore, we find that moral disengagement mediates the effects of self-efficacy on deception. Our findings suggest that self-efficacy plays a key role in shaping negotiators' ethical behaviors and we identify the psychological mechanism underlying this relationship.